Is Africa’s Current Growth Reducing Inequality? Evidence from Some Selected African Countries by Alege, Phillip et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is Africa’s Current Growth Reducing
Inequality? Evidence from Some Selected
African Countries
Phillip Alege and Emmanuel George and Paul Ojeaga and
Oluwatimiro Queen-Esther
Covenant University Nigeria, Bergamo University Italy
13 January 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62187/
MPRA Paper No. 62187, posted 28 February 2015 08:57 UTC
Is Africa’s Current Growth Reducing Inequality? Evidence from Some 
Selected African Countries 
 
George E.O. 
Alege P.O. 
*Ojeaga P.I. 
Oluwatimiro Q. 
 
Department of Economics and Development Studies 
Covenant University Nigeria 
P.M.B 1023 Ota 
 
*(Email of corresponding author drpaulojeaga@gmail.com) 
 
Abstract 
 
Is Africa’s current growth reducing inequality? What are the implications of growth on output performances in 
Africa? Does the effect of Africa’s growth on sectoral output have any implication for inequality in Africa?  The 
study investigates the effect of shocks on a set of macroeconomic variables on inequality (measured by life 
expectancy) and the implication of this on sectors that are perceived to provide economic empowerment in form of 
employment for people living in the African countries in our sample. Studies already find that growth in many 
African countries has not been accompanied with significant improvement in employment.  Therefore inequality is 
subject to a counter cyclical trend in production levels when export destination countries experience a recession. The 
study also provides insight on the effect of growth on sectorial output for three major sectors in the African economy 
with the intent of analyzing the impact of growth on sectorial development. The method used in this study is Panel 
Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) estimation and the obvious advantage of this method lies in the fact that it allows us 
to capture both static and dynamic interdependencies and to treat the links across units in an unrestricted fashion. 
Data is obtained from World Bank (WDI) Statistics for the period 1985 to 2012 (28 years) for 10 African Countries. 
Our main findings confirm strong negative relationship between GDP growth and life expectancy and also for GDP 
and the services and manufacturing sector considering the full sample.   
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1.0 Introduction  
 
In this section a brief introduction into growth and inequality is presented. According to the World Bank 
press release October 2013, Africa’s economic growth outlook continues to remain strong with an 
estimated forecast of 4.9% growth rate for 2013, it is expected that the African economy will grow by 6% 
in 2014, depicting that Africa will continue to experience strong economic growth in the years to come. 
The African region is also expected to remain a strong magnet for tourism and investment due to the 
attractiveness of the African business environment despite problems of high political instability, business 
environment risks and poor economic policies. Strong government investments, higher production in the 
mineral, agricultural and services sectors are also boosting growth in many African countries. Private 
investment and regional remittances are also on the increase, with remittances alone now worth over 33 
billion dollars supporting household income. It is clear that almost a third of the countries in the region 
are now experiencing growth rates of over 6% making African countries to be among the fastest growing 
economies in the world. This increasing growth trends however, have also been found not to translate to 
poverty reduction in many African countries. Inequality and poverty has remained quite high despite 
strong growth and the rate of poverty reduction has remained quite sluggish, with Africa still accounting 
for the highest proportion of un-enrolled school children in the World. Africa’s Pulse (2014) a World 
Bank yearly Journal, also states that despite the global economic improvement in Africa, poverty will 
continue to remain a strong concern on the continent.  Forecasting that between 16 to 33% of the entire 
World’s poor, will reside in Africa by 2030 presenting once again a future demographic challenge that 
can be an impediment to future development of the continent. The vulnerability of economic growth in 
Africa to capital flow and commodity price reduction also makes it imperative for many African countries 
to invest in times of growth in other non-performing sectors with prospects for cushioning their 
economies from global shocks (i.e. shocks associated with a sudden reduction in commodity prices and 
capital flows to the continent).  
 
This paper investigates the effects of growth on inequality in Africa by studying the implication of growth 
for sectors in the African economy that are labor intensive particularly the agricultural and services sector 
with meaningful use for economic empowerment and inequality reduction. It also investigates the effect 
of growth on the manufacturing sector that is less labor intensive with the intent understanding the impact 
of growth on the manufacturing sector. Incite is gained on the implication of growth on inequality 
reduction in general using panel vector auto regression (PVAR) which allows us to study dynamic 
interdependencies between growth and inequality reduction with the intent of establishing a link between 
growth and inequality. The impact of growth on sectoral output, particularly for sectors with capability 
for employment is also considered. Data for some ten selected African countries (they include Algeria, 
Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Cameroon and Congo) two from each major economic regions 
(i.e. North, West, East, Central, and Southern Africa) in Africa is utilized in the study for the period of 
1985 to 2012 a period of 28 years. The rest of the paper is divided into the scope and objective, review of 
literature, empirical analysis and results and the concluding sections. 
 
2.0 Scope and Objectives of the Study 
 
In this section the scope and objectives of the study are presented. The study investigates the implications 
of the current growth trend in Africa on  inequality reduction, by studying the implications of growth on 
life expectancy (as the measure for inequality) and output production in three sectors namely agricultural, 
services and the manufacturing sectors, the first two being labour intensive and the last a technological 
driven sector termed high-tech under the assumption that increased productivity in sectors will imply 
higher levels of economic empowerment through employment. The objectives of the study are:  
a.) To determine the effect of Africa’s current growth on inequality reduction 
b.) To evaluate the effect of Africa’s growth on sectorial performances in three major sectors in the 
African economy i.e. agricultural, services and manufacturing sectors. 
c.) And to investigate if the impact of Africa’s current growth has an effect on labor intensive sectors 
with the capability to reduce inequality. 
 
3.0 Stylized Facts on Growth and Inequality 
 
In this section stylized facts on growth and inequality is presented. Poor macroeconomic management, 
political instability, corruption and a host of other factors are. responsible for poor results in 
infrastructural development in many developing countries. Poverty also contributes to poor production 
output in many African countries since poor incomes means less access to quality educational and health 
facilities for a sizeable percentage of their population resulting in poor skill development.   
 
Fig. 1 Trends in inequality in Africa 
 
Note: The graph above depicts that inequality is on the decrease this is particularly noticeable from the early 
1990s. However Africa still has the World’s highest percentage of people living below the poverty line. 
Source: World Bank Gini-coefficient on inequality in Africa  
 
Trends already show that there is still a wide gap between the rich and the poor in Africa; although 
inequality is reducing (See Trends in inequality in Fig. 1), Africa still has the highest per cent of the 
world’s people living below the poverty line. This depicts the sluggishness of government policies in 
yielding results that can have meaningful effect for job creation and skill improvement. The paper by Art 
Kraay (2004) after studying the implication of growth for household income in some selected developing 
countries also state that at best, there is a negative relationship between annual average growth and annual 
growth in household in many developing countries depicting that national growth does not often translate 
to household growth in developing countries thereby suggesting a counter-cyclical relationship between 
growth and annual household growth. This shows that growth in many developing countries are often not 
inclusive, and are associated with joblessness therefore such economic expansions are not characterized  
 
Fig.2 Relationship between growth rate and poverty reduction 
 
Note: The fig above depicts that national growth does not often translate to household growth in many African 
countries suggesting a counter-cyclical relationship between growth and annual household growth. 
Source: The paper by Art Kraay (2004) “When Growth is Pro-Poor” 
 
with improved skill development and training of indigenous manpower in many developing countries. 
Trends also show that the growth rate in sub Saharan Africa remained modestly high particularly in the 
last decade according to the World Bank statistics 2013 (see fig. 3), Africa’s growth rate has been on the 
average at approximately 6% annually. Pundits also state that though the growth trend has lasted for close 
to a decade many African countries have failed to take advantage of the current trend to diversify their 
economics from simple raw material exporting economies to middle level manufacturing economies. 
Despite the  less developed nature of the African banking system compared to those of the developed 
North, the 2008 financial meltdown had strong effects on the economies of many African countries. 
Depicting an interdependent relationship, between Africa and the rest of the World. 
 
Fig. 3 Growth in Sub- Saharan Africa in the last decade 
 
 
 
Note: The figure above shows recent trends in growth for the last decade in Africa. Africa’s growth rate has been on 
the average at approximately 6% annually. This growth is often associated with sustained commodity price boom. It 
also shows the interdependency between the developed North and developing South particularly the effect of the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008 on growth in Africa. 
 
Growth in the last decade has also managed to surpass that of the 1980s (see Fig. 4), this increasing trend 
in growth has not translated to improved earnings for the mass of the population in many African 
countries. The long run implication of such growth for Africa is that productive capabilities are going to 
be limited in the future as natural resources dwindle. It also means that in the short run many African 
countries are going to continue to trade in primary goods (raw material exports), obviously missing out 
from gains often associated with product differentiation that skill and development of a robust domestic 
industrial base can provide. 
 
The quality of manpower is also a source of concern since many African economies are plagued with 
poor incomes and poor educational and other socio infrastructural amenities such as power, roads and 
housing. The overall implication for poor income increases on the continent is that it will have strong 
effects on domestic consumption and access by the poor to social amenities that could otherwise have 
long run implications on the economy. For instance strong domestic consumption could mean an 
insulation from global financial shocks as in the case of China and access to social amenities could mean 
people could live longer and transfer savings to their offspring. 
 
Fig. 4. Graph of poverty rate and GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Note: The above graph depicts the counter-cyclical nature of Poverty on GDP in Africa. This depicts that improved 
growth showing in the last decade i.e. year 2000 onwards has not translated to strong reduction in the income gap 
between the rich and poor in many African countries. 
Source: World Bank data  
 
Trends also suggest that there is a relationship in movements in GDP across the different regions of the 
world see Fig. 5. Financial shocks are also seen to be transmitted from high income countries to other 
regions in subsequent periods. This once again depicts the interdependent nature of the global economy. 
Capital flows in times of economic shock can have strong effects for many developing countries receiving 
foreign aid, so also can it affect foreign direct investment to the private sector of the economies of many 
developing countries since investors are often known to repatriate funds back to their domestic economies 
in times of crisis. The implication of such negative capital flows for developing countries is that such 
reduction will in turn affect the volume of their public expenditure spending. This reduces their capability 
of providing social infrastructure and other social amenities which have the tendency to reduce the gap 
between the rich and poor. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5   GDP per capita in Developed, Developing and African Countries 
 
 
Note: The figure above compares GDP in high income countries to those of other developing countries and Africa. 
Financial shocks are seen to be transmitted from high income countries to other regions in subsequent periods. This 
once again depicts the interdependent nature of the global economy. 
Source: World Bank Statistics 2010 
 
 
4.0 Review of Literature 
 
In this section we review some past literature on the subject under study. Past studies have utilized panel 
regressions in studying, the effect of capital flows particularly in times of banking crisis on aid supply and 
find that aid supply decreases after the first two periods in times of crisis Laeven and Valencia (2010). 
Historical evidences of the effect of capital flows have found that recessions are likely to have deep and 
prolonged effects on growth and fiscal balance and cause significant disturbances to government revenue 
and expenditure Reinhart and Roghoff (2008). 
 
The variables used in the study are based on instrumental variables for poverty (life expectancy, Misery 
index etc) and aid Hansen and Tarp (2001), Rajan Subramanian (2008) and Ojeaga (2014). VAR models 
are also employed, the models employed in the paper by Frot (2009) is extended for the purpose of the 
study. The variables employed in the analysis in the study have been found to have significant relevance 
for life expectancy in one or more past literature. They include GDP per capita, fiscal variables such as 
government expenditure spending and sectorial output from manufacturing, services and agriculture see 
Chong and Granstein (2008), Faini (2006), Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) Dang et al (2009) and Frot 
(2009). 
 
The aim of the study is to investigate the extent to which capital flows affect inequality in Africa using 
data from some selected countries and compare the response of life expectancy and output productivity 
particularly in three sectors that can influence economic empowerment which include the agricultural, 
manufacturing and services sectors to unexpected shocks. It is worthy of note to state also that other 
studies have presented counter argument rejecting the possible relationship between decreases in capital 
flows and economic recessions stating that capital flows does not depend solely on economic factors, 
arguing that political factors and strategic decisions about where to invest were more relevant see Paxton 
and Knack (2008) for such a critical position. However, in this study, it was found that economic 
factors influence capital flows and significantly affects fiscal spending which in turn have grave 
consequences for inequality. 
 
 
5.0 Empirical Analysis and Results  
5.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
In this subsection the theoretical framework of the study is presented. We assume that there are i=1,…..t 
sectors in the economy of countries, contributing to their aggregate output production of which export is a 
useful fraction and that exports from countries will flow to different export destination countries j= 
1,……j. Private sector production is also not purely to promote welfare and production of satisfactory 
public goods in countries but mainly for the private interest (profits for the private entrepreneur) which is 
the returns on invested revenue i.e. firms profit maximization ends. Therefore firms in countries are 
indirect consumers of production. The framework portrays aggregate production therefore as a private 
rather than a public good. Large firms will therefore produce fewer goods per total revenue than small 
firms, since large numbers of shareholders will mean more profits shared, rather reinvested in the 
production process. The aim of this paper is to investigate, the effect of the choice of producers to 
consume indirect production or maximize welfare. Therefore we can let the producers in sectors have the 
utility function expressed in equation 1 as 
 
(1) ݑ௜,௧ = f ( ௜ܲ௝,௧ܥ௜,௧)   
Where ௜ܲ௝,௧  is aggregate production in a country across sectors j in firm i at time t, and  ܥ௜,௝     is the total 
consumption   in firm i at time t. Individual preferences for firm goods can be written as expressed by 
Chong and Gradstein (2008) as  
 
(2)  U= ஺ܷ  ( ௜ܲ௝,௧) + ௖ܷ  ܥ௜,௧    = ଵଵିఙ ߙ ௜ܲ௝,௧ଵିఙ + ଵଵିఙ ܥ௜ ,௧ଵିఙ  , ߙ > 0     
 
The parameter ߙ is the preferences for goods produced and ߪ is the elasticity of substitution between two 
goods. Income is also allocated between consumption, government expenditure and firms, therefore if 
price is numeraire, then firms budget constraint will be  
 
(3)  ௜ܻ,௧ = ܥ௜,௧  ௜ܲ௝,௧ఈ ܦ௜,௧ఉ    where   ߚ > 0 
 
Where ߚ represents preferences for internal expenditures and ܦ௜,௧  represents cost of transaction between 
firms and markets (external expenditure). Revenues ܴ௜.௧  come from sales ௜ܵ.௧ and from bank credit  ܤ௜.௧  
that are used to finance production and other firm internal costs, expressed as 
   
(4) ܴ௜.௧ =  ௜ܵ.௧  +ܤ௜.௧ 
(5) ܴ௜.௧ =  ߙ ௜ܲ௝,௧+ ߚܦ௜,௧ = ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
Therefore firm output will follow production targets across sectors representing aggregate output in 
countries which will be subject to external shocks and deviation, where the adjustment to such shocks will 
take longer than one period. The production of goods by firms i in countries will be subject to available 
resources for production and other internal cost incurred by firms in their day to day production. Such 
cost related to unstable economic conditions will affect production levels ௜ܲ௝,௧ିௌ  and could also be 
associated with other long run impacts expressed as the lagged variables of the internal cost of firms  
ܦ௜,௧ି௦ . Allowing us to state production below as  
 
(6) ௜ܲ௃,௧  = ௜ܲ௃,௧ିௌ   ∑ ܦ௜,௧ூ,்௜ୀଵ
்ୀଵ
∑ ܦ௜,௧ିௌூ,்௜ୀଵ
்ୀଵ
 ( ௜ܻ,௧)(ߝ௜,௧) 
 
With ߝ௜,௧  representing, other country or time specific shocks, and s indicating the number of lagged 
periods. The impact of crisis shocks will be function firms internal needs, financial condition of 
consuming countries and exporting countries, social conditions in producing countries and other political 
preferences. 
 
(7) ܦ௜,௧  = ݂(݀௜,௧  ; ௜݂,௧; ݌௜,௧) 
 
Production will be an increasing function of good financial conditions, political concerns, social 
conditions and available resources and decreasing function of social needs since firms having their own 
profit maximizing interests expressed below as  
 
(8) డ஽
డௗ
< 0 ,              డ஽
డ௣
> 0 ,           డ஽
డ௙
> 0,                      డ஽
డ௒
> 0 
 
5.2  Empirical Analysis  
 
In this subsection the intuition for the study is presented. The analysis is based on VAR, it adequately 
stems from the fact that it studies interdependencies among variables without worrying about the direction 
of causality. It is flexible and the method treats all variables in the system as endogenous and 
independent, each variable is explained by its own lagged values and those of the other variables. 
 
It is also a system of equations and not a one equation model. Panel VAR also allows for the investigation 
of unobservable individual heterogeneity and improve asymptotic results. The results provide useful 
insights which go beyond coefficients to reveal the adjustment and resilience of unexpected production 
shocks as well as the importance of other different shocks. Canova and Ciccarelli (2004), give a brief 
description of the PVAR analysis expressing the general form as  
 
(9) ݕ௜,௧= ଴ܲ݌௜,௧ +ܮଵݕ௜ ,௧ିଵ+…….+ ܮ௣ݕ௜ ,௧ି௣+ݑ௧ 
 
where  ݕ௜,௧ is a kx1 vector of k panel data variables, and i= 1,……, I, ݌௜,௧ is a vector of deterministic terms 
such as the linear trend, dummy variables or a constant, ଴ܲ is the associated parameter matrix and the  L’s 
are k x k parameter matrices attached to the lagged variables ݕ௜,௧. The lag order is represented by p, the 
error process is represented by three components, ߤ௜,௧ the country specific effect, ߛ௧  the yearly effect and 
ߝ௜,௧ the disturbance term. Two restrictions are imposed by the specification: a.) It assumes common slope 
coefficients, and it does not allow for interdependencies across units. Therefore the estimates L are 
interpreted as average dynamics in the response to shocks. All variables depend on the past of all 
variables in the system as with the basic VAR model with the individual country specific terms been the 
difference. 
 
This study tries to establish that movements in growth have an intrinsic effect on inequality (life 
expectancy to be specific) and production across sectors particularly those that have the capability of 
employing a sizeable amount of the population in sub-Saharan Africa. The study applies panel data 
analysis to past production volumes. There are other studies that have studied the effect of aid in times of 
crisis e.g. Gravier-Rymaszewska (2012), Hansen and Heady (2010) also study the effect of aid on net 
imports and spending using PVAR. 
 
The study uses PVAR approach to estimate the effect on inequality and sectorial production output of 
unexpected shocks to a set of variables that are responsive to economic upturns. The method is suitable 
since the VAR method does not require the imposition of strong structural relationship and another merit 
is that only a minimal set of assumptions are needed to interpret the impact of shocks on each variable. 
The reduced form equation allows for the implementation of dynamic simulations once the unknown 
parameters are estimated. However the method only allows for the analysis of short run adjustments 
effects and not the long run structural effects. 
 
The results come in form of the impulse response functions (IRFs) and their coefficients analysis as well 
as their forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) which allows for the examination of 
technological innovations or shocks to any variable in question to other variables. Orthogonalizing the 
response allows us to identify the effect of one shock at a time while others are held constant. The 
Choleski decomposition method of variance covariance matrix of residuals is adopted, the identification is 
based on the premise that variables which appear earlier in the system are more exogenous than those 
which appear later and are assumed endogenous. Implying that the variables that follow are affected by 
the earlier variables contemporaneously with lags and the later variables affect previous variables only 
with lags. 
 
The simple VAR model is presented below with three variables: GDP per capita, government spending 
(govspend) and sectorial output (Sec.Out/GDP) as a percentage of GDP interchangeably with inequality 
although we emphasize on sectorial output for brevity in explanations, in the above order required for the 
VAR system estimation.  Therefore GDP per capita is the most exogenous variable and production output 
from sectors as a percentage of GDP and inequality as the case maybe are the most endogenous variables. 
Output from sectors is endogenously affected by GDP and government spending (particularly on 
infrastructural development which has the capability of attracting FDI through the provision of enabling 
environment); higher GDP will mean probably higher output from sectors ordinarily.   
 
A sector is not likely to affect GDP adversely particularly in economies with multiple sectors however 
diminished social infrastructural provision due to diminished government spending on social 
infrastructure will mean poor  FDI inflow is likely to affect GDP making capital inflow into the economy 
a buffer for effects of shocks from sectorial output to aggregate GDP. The model interpretation requires a 
delay in the direct observation of sectorial output and profits attributable to firms given the business 
environment, therefore GDP will only respond to sectorial performances with lag. The three variable 
model is a simple model that contains GDP per capita, government spending and sectorial outputs Sec. 
out/GDP expressed in this particular order for the identification of the VAR system.  
 GDP per capita ௜,௧ → govspend௜,௧  → (ௌ௘௖ .ை௨௧ீ஽௉ )௜,௧. 
 
This allows us to state that a set of endogenous equations influence each other therefore sectorial output is 
contemporaneously affected by GDP and government spending. Lower GDP will therefore result in lower 
output in firms and lower FDI inflows due to poor social infrastructural provision will affect firm capacity 
to produce also. Theoretically therefore GDP will respond only to sectorial outputs from past periods. The 
three variable PVAR model is presented below as  
 
൥
1 ߙଵଶ    ߙଵଷ 
ߙଶଵ  1 ߙଶଷ 
ߙଷଵ  ߙଷଶ  1 ൩  
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Where ݕ௜,௧ is a 3 variable vector including 3 endogenous variables: GDP per capita ∆ ீ஽௉௉ை௉  , government 
spending ∆݃݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀  and sectorial outputs   ∆ ୗ୉େை௎்
ீ஽௉
. The coefficients of the contemporaneous 
relationship are given by L, which is a 3x3 matrix that depicts the relationship between the 3 variables. 
The impulse response of sectorial outputs to shocks in GDP and government spending are subjects of 
strong interests in the study see Gravier-Rymaszewska (2012) for further discussion. 
 
 
5.3  Data Presentation 
 
In this subsection the data for the study is presented. The VAR estimation technique requires that the data 
is transformed to remove the trend and only keep data with variations. Employing the use of panel data 
ensures that the underlying structure is the same for each cross sectional unit .i.e. the matrices L 
coefficients are the same for all the countries in the sample. Fixed effects (ߤ௜) are introduced to overcome 
the restriction of the above constraint and allow for country heterogeneity. The limitations that the fixed 
effects are correlated with the regressors due to the use of lags of the dependent variables (Arellano and 
Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998), makes us adopt a procedure called the Helmert transformation, a 
forward mean-differencing to eliminate the fixed effects (Arellano and Bover 1995) to keep the 
orthogonality between variables and their lags so that lags can be employed as instruments. 
The issue of cross-sectional autocorrelation is dealt with by subtracting from each series at any time the 
average of the group see Levin and Lin (2002), for cross-sectional auto-correlation related to the common 
factors. The model is run in first difference to emphasize on the dynamics of sectorial output (and life 
expectancy as the case maybe) adjustments to and short run effects of shocks. The data is tested for 
stationarity in order to proceed with panel VAR. The data is in fact stationary as they are in first 
differences although the test is carried out for scrutiny. The main variables of interest are GDP per capital, 
government spending, and sectoral output from sectors. Data for some ten selected African countries 
(they include Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Cameroon and Congo) two from each 
major economic regions (i.e. North, West, East, Central, and Southern Africa) in Africa is utilized in the 
study for the period of 1985 to 2012 a period of 28 years all obtained from World Bank Data, are found to 
be stationary after conducting the Levin and Lin (2002), the Breitung (2001) and the Im, peaseran snd 
Shin (2003) unit root test . These are reported in the table below. It is therefore appropriate based on these 
test to proceed by estimating the model with panel VAR models. 
  
Table 1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
Variables→ 
Test  
    ↓ 
Life exp. Man.Sec. Out Agr.Sec.Out. Ser.Sec.Out. Gov.spending GDP per capita 
Levin-Lin- Chu 
Adjusted t* 
p-value 
 
-17.6118 
0.0001 
 
-18.4072 
0.0000 
 
-13.0876 
0.0000 
 
15.0543 
0.0000 
 
-12.0567 
0.0000 
 
-0.6510 
0.0000 
Breitung unit-root 
test 
Lambda 
p-value  
 
-3.8734 
0.0000 
 
-2.5412 
0.0002 
 
-8.8761 
0.0000 
 
-2.1265 
0.0000 
 
-3.7645 
0.0016 
 
-2.8712 
0.0000 
Im-Peasaran-Shin 
z-tilde-bar 
p-value 
 
-4.2176 
0.0000 
 
-5.3127 
0.0000 
 
-3.7167 
0.0018 
 
-4.7123 
0.0000 
 
-2.6519 
0.0000 
 
-6.8712 
0.0000 
 
Note: ܪ଴: Panels contain unit roots ܪఈ  : Panels are stationary Common AR parameter 
Number of panels = 10 
Number of periods = GDP per capita (27) le (27) Gov. spending (25) Agr. Sec. out. (25) Man. sec. out.(24) Ser. Sec. out (24) 
Source: Authors Compilations 
 
 
5.4 Discussion of Results 
 
In this subsection a discussion of the results is undertaken. The study investigates the effect of shocks on 
a set of macroeconomic variables on inequality (measured by life expectancy) and the implication of 
these on three sectors (i.e. the agricultural, services and manufacturing sectors) that are perceived to 
provide economic empowerment in form of employment for people living in the African countries in our 
sample. Our main findings confirm strong negative relationship between GDP growth and life expectancy 
considering the whole sample. The response of life expectancy to GDP shocks is stronger and significant 
in the second lag of GDP. This suggests that improvement in GDP growth does not cause any reasonable 
improvement in inequality reduction since government spending were not sufficiently reducing mortality 
rates in countries.   
 
While GDP explains more of the government expenditure spending pattern in countries, negative GDP 
shocks are likely to account for up to 15% of government spending reduction in countries. The impulse 
response function gives us information on the short run dynamics of shocks impact. Most shocks start to 
have noticeable influences on the economy after the third lag and are likely to be absorbed probably 4 to 5 
periods later. Our analysis of results suggests that shocks trigger structural changes, while government 
spending is negatively affected by GDP shocks, spending are likely to become more resilient after 
adjustments to shocks, therefore in times of growth expenditure spending are also likely to increase. The 
transmission of GDP shocks to inequality therefore is likely to be through expenditure spending on social 
welfare and infrastructural provision which despite increased growth in recent time has not sufficiently 
improved living conditions in many African countries 
 
Finally, on extending the model to three sectors (the agricultural sector, services sector and manufacturing 
sectors) that have the capability to provide economic empowerment, we find that economic fluctuations 
decreases government spending and introduces a level of uncertainty to output production in sectors, 
government fiscal and monetary policies were found to have strong consequences on inequality and 
expenditure spending decisions, therefore these economic variables and government decisions were 
largely shaping inequality in countries. 
 
 
System GMM Main Results for the Three Variable PVAR Model  
Table 2 Full Sample Regression for Life Expectancy 
SHOCKS 
Response of  
 
Response to 
ܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 
 
Response to 
ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଵ  Response to ܩܦ ௧ܲିଶ  Response to ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଶ 
Life.exp. -.00002 
(.00002) 
t=-.9023 
-.0013 
(.0008)* 
t=-1.7051 
-.00010 
(.00002)*** 
t=-3.8957 
.0006 
(.0009) 
t=.6934 
Notes: ***indicates 1 percent significance level t-test> 2.35: ** 5 percent significance level t-test > 1.96 , * 10 
percent significance level t-test > 1.65 respectively. All standard errors are in parenthesis. The model is estimated 
by system GMM, while the country fixed effects and common factors are remover before estimation.   
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Full Sample Regressions for Manufacturing Sector Output 
SHOCKS 
Response of  
 
Response to  
ܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 
 
Response to  
ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଵ  Response to  ܩܦ ௧ܲିଶ  Response to  ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଶ 
Manufacturing 
Output 
.0001 
(.0100) 
t=.01 
-.0065 
(.5030) 
t=.0130 
-.0010 
(.0010) 
t=.01 
-.0267 
(.0854) 
t=.313 
Notes: ***indicates 1 percent significance level t-test> 2.35: ** 5 percent significance level t-test > 1.96 , * 10 
percent significance level t-test > 1.65 respectively. All standard errors are in parenthesis. The model is estimated 
by system GMM, while the country fixed effects and common factors are remover before estimation.   
 
Table 4 Full Sample Regression for Agricultural Sector Output 
SHOCKS 
Response of  
 
Response to 
ܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 
 
Response to 
ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଵ  Response to ܩܦ ௧ܲିଶ  Response to ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଶ 
Agricultural 
Output 
-.0017 
(.0014) 
t=-1.21 
.0210 
(.1789) 
t=.12 
.0013 
(.0015) 
t=.86 
.1944 
(.3348) 
t=.581 
Notes: ***indicates 1 percent significance level t-test> 2.35: ** 5 percent significance level t-test > 1.96 , * 10 
percent significance level t-test > 1.65 respectively. All standard errors are in parenthesis. The model is estimated 
by system GMM, while the country fixed effects and common factors are remover before estimation.   
 
Table 5 Full Sample regression for Services Sector Output 
SHOCKS 
Response of  
 
Response to  
ܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 
 
Response to  
ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଵ  Response to  ܩܦ ௧ܲିଶ  Response to  ܩ݋ݒ. ݏ݌݁݊݀௧ିଶ 
Services Output .0012 
(.0038) 
t=.32 
.1883 
(.1780) 
t=1.05 
-.0007 
(.0045) 
t=-.1568 
-.3092 
(.1794)* 
t=1.72 
Notes: ***indicates 1 percent significance level t-test> 2.35: ** 5 percent significance level t-test > 1.96 , * 10 
percent significance level t-test > 1.65 respectively. All standard errors are in parenthesis. The model is estimated 
by system GMM, while the country fixed effects and common factors are remover before estimation.   
Source: Authors Compilation 
 
The analysis of above results is as follows, the effect of shocks in the first period does not significantly affect life 
expectancy. This is however significant in the second period -.0001 see table 2. Government fiscal spending had a 
decreasing effect on life expectancy -.0013 (t=-1.7051) see table 2, in the first period but dies away in subsequent 
periods, this depicts that government often adjust budget deficit and seek alternative ways to fund socio 
infrastructure. See also tables 6 to 9 to see the effect of shocks in subsequent periods. 
 
For sectors GDP and fiscal shocks are not noticeable in the first periods for manufacturing and services see table 3 
and 4 .0001 and .0012 respectively, however these have negative effects on the sectors in the second period. The 
agricultural sectors in many African economies is characterized by large informal subsistence cultivation GDP 
shocks are not noticeable in the second period. 
 
Persistence of shocks was found to have strong negative effects on life expectancy (depicting increases in 
inequality). Shock persistence was found to also have negative implications for the services and manufacturing 
sectors leading to contraction in output productivity from these sectors. Decreases in sectoral output will mean less 
capacity for sectors to create meaningful employment even though this may not suggest a high level of staff 
disengagement. 
 
Table: 6 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the full Sample with Life expectancy  
Variance of life expectancy as explained by shocks in each variable 
Full Sample  
Variables 
t=2 t=3 t=4 t=6 t=8 
GDP per capita 0.0003 0.0013 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 
Gov.spend 0.0674 0.0946 0.1218 0.1218 0.1218 
Life. Exp. 0.9322 0.9042 0.8762 0.8762 0.8762 
 Source: Authors Compilations 
 
 
Table: 7 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the full Sample with Agricultural sector output 
Variance of agricultural output as explained by shocks in each variable 
Full Sample  
Variables 
t=2 t=3 t=4 t=6 t=8 
GDP per capita .0112 .0101 .0090 .0079 .0079 
Gov. spend .0135 .0114 .0093 .0072 .0072 
Agr. out .9746 .9784 .9862 .9940 .9940 
Source: Authors Compilations 
 
 
Table: 8 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the full Sample with Service Sector Output 
Variance of services output as explained by shocks in each variable 
Full Sample  
Variables 
t=2 t=3 t=4 t=6 t=8 
GDP per capita .0548 .9999 1.4500 1.4500 1.4500 
Gov. spend .1273 .1517 .1517 .1517 .1517 
Ser. Out. .8178 .7484 .6792 .6792 .6792 
Source: Authors Compilations 
 
 
 
 Table: 9 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the full Sample with Manufacturing Sector Output 
Variance of life expectancy as explained by shocks in each variable 
Full Sample  
Variables 
t=2 t=3 t=4 t=6 t=8 
GDP per capita .8673 .8867 .8860 .8860 .8860 
Gov. spend .1123 .1124 .1125 .1125 .1125 
Man. out .0203 .0209 .0215 .0215 .0215 
Source: Authors Compilations 
 
The response of government to shocks to GDP and fiscal spending in their decision to improve welfare 
were found to be interesting. It was observed that while decreases in welfare were noticeable and affected 
inequality in subsequent periods. Fiscal spending decreases were only noticeable initially. In subsequent 
periods governments probably adjusted budgets and sourced for alternative funds to finance 
infrastructural provision. 
 
The variance decomposition for sectors yield that shocks to the manufacturing and services sectors affect 
output production for sectors. The negative effects of shocks to the agricultural sector are less; this is due 
to the informal nature of the sector. 
Fig. 6 One lag impulse response function of life expectancy to shocks in GDP and government Spending 
 
                  Source: Author’s computations 
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Fig. 7 Two lag impulse response function of life expectancy to shocks in GDP and government Spending 
 
 
    Source: Author’s computations 
 
Fig. 8 Three lag impulse response function of life expectancy to shocks in GDP and government Spending 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations 
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Impulse-responses for 3 lag VAR of gdp govspend lifeexp
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps
response of gdp to gdp shock
s
 (p 5) gdp  gdp
 (p 95) gdp
0 6
0.0000
133.6891
response of gdp to govspend shock
s
 (p 5) govspend  govspend
 (p 95) govspend
0 6
-46.1546
76.2956
response of gdp to lifeexp shock
s
 (p 5) lifeexp  lifeexp
 (p 95) lifeexp
0 6
-27.0678
38.2408
response of govspend to gdp shock
s
 (p 5) gdp  gdp
 (p 95) gdp
0 6
-0.4541
0.0892
response of govspend to govspend shock
s
 (p 5) govspend  govspend
 (p 95) govspend
0 6
0.0000
1.8351
response of govspend to lifeexp shock
s
 (p 5) lifeexp  lifeexp
 (p 95) lifeexp
0 6
-0.1004
0.3012
response of lifeexp to gdp shock
s
 (p 5) gdp  gdp
 (p 95) gdp
0 6
-0.2491
0.0000
response of lifeexp to govspend shock
s
 (p 5) govspend  govspend
 (p 95) govspend
0 6
-0.1885
0.0035
response of lifeexp to lifeexp shock
s
 (p 5) lifeexp  lifeexp
 (p 95) lifeexp
0 6
0.0000
0.3789
Fig. 9 One lag impulse response function of agricultural output to shocks in GDP and government 
Spending 
 
     Source: Author’s computations 
 
Fig. 10 Two lag impulse response function of agricultural output to shocks in GDP and government 
Spending 
 
Source: Author’s Computations 
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Impulse-responses for 2 lag VAR of gdp govspend agricout
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Fig. 11 Three lag impulse response function of agricultural output to shocks in GDP and government 
Spending 
 
Source: Author’s Computations 
 
 
Fig. 12 One lag impulse response function of services output to shocks in GDP and government Spending 
 
Source: Author’s Computations 
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Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of gdp govspend serviceout
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Fig. 13 Two lag impulse response function of services output to shocks in GDP and government Spending 
 
Source: Author’s Computations 
 
Fig. 14 Three lag impulse response function of services output to shocks in GDP and government Spending 
 
Source: Authors Computations 
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Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps
response of gdp to gdp shock
s
 (p 5) gdp  gdp
 (p 95) gdp
0 6
-40.9541
426.3102
response of gdp to govspend shock
s
 (p 5) govspend  govspend
 (p 95) govspend
0 6
-1.1e+02
146.6459
response of gdp to serviceout shock
s
 (p 5) serviceout  serviceout
 (p 95) serviceout
0 6
-5.7e+02
298.5542
response of govspend to gdp shock
s
 (p 5) gdp  gdp
 (p 95) gdp
0 6
-6.6623
0.3571
response of govspend to govspend shock
s
 (p 5) govspend  govspend
 (p 95) govspend
0 6
-0.0402
6.0610
response of govspend to serviceout shock
s
 (p 5) serviceout  serviceout
 (p 95) serviceout
0 6
-0.8868
14.4169
response of serviceout to gdp shock
s
 (p 5) gdp  gdp
 (p 95) gdp
0 6
-14.3325
0.3433
response of serviceout to govspend shock
s
 (p 5) govspend  govspend
 (p 95) govspend
0 6
-0.7050
12.3517
response of serviceout to serviceout shock
s
 (p 5) serviceout  serviceout
 (p 95) serviceout
0 6
0.0000
32.9414
Impulse-responses for 3 lag VAR of gdp govspend serviceout
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Fig. 15 One lag impulse response function of manufacturing output to shocks in GDP and government 
Spending 
 
 
Source: Authors Computations 
 
Fig. 16 Two lag impulse response function of manufacturing output to shocks in GDP and government 
Spending 
 
Source: Authors Computations 
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Impulse-responses for 2 lag VAR of gdp govspend manufactout
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Fig. 17 Three lag impulse response function of manufacturing output to shocks in GDP and government 
Spending 
 
Source: Authors Computations 
 
In providing answers to the study objectives we rely on the results outcomes: 
a.) Although the effect of GDP shocks to life expectancy were not immediate, it was found to be 
transmitting reducing effects to life expectancy and increasing inequality in countries. 
b.) Negative shocks were also exerted on sectoral output production for the services and 
manufacturing sectors although these did not have significant implications for manufacturing.  
c.) Negative shocks were found to have weak implications for the services sector, this was not 
noticeable for the agricultural sector, and these are two labour intensive sectors (services and 
agricultural sectors) with significant implicative effects for employment. 
 
6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
In this subsection we conclude. Negative shocks to GDP were found to significantly increase inequality in 
countries particularly after the first periods. The same were observed for sectors although the results were 
only weakly significant for the services sector. The impulse response function of life expectancy to GDP 
and fiscal spending had strong negative implications for life expectancy. For sectors these were not 
immediately noticeable for the manufacturing and services sector outputs and no decreases were observed 
Impulse-responses for 3 lag VAR of gdp govspend manufactout
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for the agricultural sector. The shock to fiscal spending on life expectancy increased inequality after the 
first period and were found to frizzle out in the subsequent periods as government adapted to shocks, 
through budget adjustments. 
 
GDP and fiscal shocks due to financial volatility were found to have negative impacts on life expectancy 
and out across sectors indicating that a high level of uncertainty due to financial friction can have strong 
consequences for inequality in Africa, although this effect was not significant for the manufacturing and 
agricultural sector outputs. In concluding, the assertion earlier made that a sector is not likely to affect 
GDP adversely particularly in economies with multiple sectors but that diminished social infrastructural 
provision due to reduction in government spending on social infrastructure will mean poor FDI inflow 
was quite plausible since it is likely to affect GDP, making capital inflow into the economy a buffer for 
effects of shocks from sectors to aggregate GDP. 
 
 6.2 Recommendation 
In this subsection we make useful recommendation for policy purposes. It is necessary for government to 
provide basic social security blankets for people living below the poverty line in many African countries 
by making basic medical facilities more accessible and easily affordable particularly in rural communities 
to help reduce poverty and mortality rates in general, since it was discovered that GDP shocks to life 
expectancy was transmitting reducing effects to life expectancy and increasing inequality in countries. 
 
Sectoral performances also show poor ability of labour intensive sector to withstand the negative shocks 
in GDP. Adequate attention should be paid to socio infrastructural challenges as this could reduce the 
transaction cost of private firm activity. Since government also seem to be the highest employer of labour 
in the services sector e.g. schools, hospitals, airports and other social services, encouragement of other 
sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture where such negative implicative job reducing effects are 
likely to occur should be boosted.  
 
Finally effective use of government funds as an intervention mechanism particularly in short term sectoral 
improvements such as business information provision, reduction in business permits processing time and 
avoidance of multiple taxation could encourage private investment in the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors  
 
The Authors Express Thanks to Inesa Love for PVAR Codes, and express heartfelt gratitude to Gravier-
Rymaszewska for making his paper available. 
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